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mudslides,terrorist
earthquakes,
Tsunamis, hurricanes,

attacks,and war can be massively and incomprehensibly catastrophicevents. They can obliterateentirecommunities and societies, including marketing systems and
processes requisite to sustain those societies. "Lucky"survivors often struggleto subsist in the bleakest, most unsafe,
unsanitary,and dangerousconditions-often from minuteto
minute.
The best initial efforts to restore some semblance of stability typically rest in humanitarianaid and other forms of
donor assistance from unaffected and/or wealthy countries
and institutions,such as the Red Cross, Red Crescent, and
the United Nations High Commissionerfor Refugees. However, aid and assistance are inadequatefor large-scale market reconstruction, full societal recovery, and long-term
welfare. Resource-strappedagencies are unable to meet all
the needs over time, donor fatigue saps energy from wellintendedprojects,and the inevitable next catastrophedraws
resourcesand attentionfrom previously devastatedregions.
Sometimes pledges never materialize,as evidenced with the
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reconstructionefforts with respect to the World TradeCenter, HurricaneKatrina,and many places devastatedby the
tsunami that swept across the Indian Ocean (e.g., Dewan,
Connelly and Lehren 2006; The New York Times 2005).
Therefore,other mechanismsfor marketand society reconstructionmust be implemented.
Full or optimalrecoveryrequireslong-termcommitments
and coordinated orchestration by numerous institutions,
including governments, nongovernmental organizations,
firms/marketers,andconsumers.Good governanceis imperative to the process. Well-governed markets, countries,
regions, and communities tend to suffer less damage initially and to recover more quickly from catastrophe
(Allenby and Fink 2005; Shultz 2005). Policies that favor
investment and broad forms of engagement in devastated
areas are needed. This idea has not been lost on others. In
referring to recovery efforts in the wake of the recent
tsunami, The Economist (2005, pp. 51-52) notes that "aid
agencies have bombarded fisherman with offers of new
boats, but no one has paid to rebuildthe factories that used
to supply the ice to preservetheir catch."
In short, too often, there is no coordinated effort to
(re)build a sustainable, functional marketing system; aid
agencies favor projects such as schools, but they often
neglect important infrastructureprojects, such as roads,
ports, and sewage. In general, conditions deter privatesector investment, which is vital for enterprise creation,
jobs, and socioeconomic development. Potential investors
interested in important infrastructureprojects and other
forms of engagementusually view the devastatedareasthat
would benefit the most as being too risky. This is especially
truein war-ravagedand politically volatile areas,where catastrophecan exacerbatetensions, often making them even
less inviting. Because furtherconflict is possible and still
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more destruction and suffering are likely, a truly vicious
cycle of devastation and deprivation results. The cycle
becomes particularlydifficult to break when governments
fear and resist engagement with investors from countries
with differentculturaland political values, despite obvious
societal benefits that can result from investment.Therefore,
recoveryfrom catastropherequiresa skillful melding of policy, market understandingand risk assessment, financial
services and markets, and marketing practices to rebuild
sustainablemarketingsystems as evinced by prosperousand
peaceful societies.
In this article, we address the integrationof these issues
towardefficacious marketand societal recoveryin the aftermath of catastrophe.We do this with an eye towardseveral
themes espoused in the call for papers for this special
section-namely, the role of marketing in reconstruction
from catastrophicdevastation, including the roles of economic and tradepolicy and the social, moral, and legal obligations to assist recovering economies (Mittelstaedt2007).
We contend, perhapscounterintuitively,that there are some
inherentadvantagesto risk and instability if there is flexibility to respondto this uncertainty.Risk and instabilitycan
expedite domestic or foreign direct investment(FDI) to the
benefit of marketing firms and to the marketing systems,
countries,andcitizensin the destroyedarea,country,or region.

Riskand(War)Recovery
Countriesor areasthatare recoveringfrom catastrophicmilitary hostilities and are also rebuildingeconomies are risky
markets. There is considerably more risk endemic to the
process of marketingto, with, and in these marketsand to
managing value chains (from source to consumer) than in
marketsthat are not recovering from war (Kwok and Reeb
2000). Notably, risk has been revisited as a scholarly focal
point for marketingand public policy, though it has largely
been studied from a consumer's perspective (e.g., Johnson
2004). We expand the perspective by taking a crossdisciplinary tack; that is, we consider financial and broad
market risks with implications for marketing, managerial
decision making, and, ultimately,policy and recovery.
We examine war and other forms of calculated military
and paramilitaryarmed conflict because of the systemic
depth and breadth of devastation and the human element
thatcauses and sustainsthem and, accordingly,because they
likely are the most difficult catastrophes from which to
recover. Moreover, and as we hinted at previously, other
catastrophescan slip into armedconflict and other forms of
violence, resultingin more death and destruction.This possibility was and is true of BandaAceh, Sri Lanka(both devastatedby the 2004 tsunami),and even New Orleans(more
recently damaged by HurricaneKatrina).Thus, strategies,
tactics, and solutions for war recovery likely can be leveraged to provide relief and recovery efforts from other
catastrophes.
More specifically, we examine the amalgam of factors
that affect risk and recovery in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and Slovenia, countriesthat emanatedfrom the disintegrated Yugoslavia and are still experiencing the economic
and social impacts of wars that occurredin the 1990s (e.g.,
Shultz et al. 2005). Various sources of risk are likely to create considerable variability in the returnsfrom marketing

investment in and export to these recovering economies
(Kwok and Reeb 2000; Miller 1992),1 which in turn will
affect the pace and scope of recovery. Despite compelling
reasons to enter such markets (e.g., pent-up consumer
demand, market size, the inevitable need for food), many
exportersof value-addedfood products, for example, have
chosen to avoid the countriesthat emerged from the former
Yugoslav republics (FYR) because traditional measures
suggest thatlevels of risk are unacceptable.2Although commercial countryrisk measuresare often helpful in providing
broad insights into political and economic conditions, they
have been found to have little power in predictingperiodsof
intense instability or unique opportunity(e.g., Oetzel, Bettis, and Zenner2000).
Although any export or business venture in a recovering
economy is risky, there may actuallybe value in this uncertainty, especially if marketingmanagershave and maintain
flexibility to respondto it. Consistentwith this idea, Miller
(1992) suggests several strategies that companies can
employ when they arefaced with uncertainty(risks) in internationalmarkets.If the value of this strategicflexibility can
be quantified at the time an investment decision is made
(e.g., duringthe considerationof an export venture),it may
indicate that the venture is more valuable than originally
believed. Real-options analysis, also known as contingent
claims analysis, is a frameworkthat can be used to value
managerialflexibility in the presence of uncertainty(e.g.,
Copeland and Keenan 1998; Dixit and Pindyck 1994), and
it has been suggested for valuing marketingstrategy (Dias
and Ryals 2002; Ward and Ryals 2001). Failureto consider
the existence and value of real options embedded in any
risky investmentlikely underestimatesthe true value of the
investment(Mun 2002).
If U.S. food enterprisesintend to invest in more markets
replete with more risks, they need a way to evaluate more
appropriatelymarketing relationships in the presence of
uncertainty,which may be unruly at times (Thomas 2001).
This is particularlytrue when consideringan export venture
to FYR and other recovering economies. Although all
export ventures are exposed to uncertainty, the lingering
perceptionof instability and war in these countries may be
the greatesthindrancefor trade to and in the region. Given
some shortcomingsin previously mentioned measures and
techniques, a real-options approachto evaluating prospective exportventuresto FYR is compelling. If managersconsidered the option value of their strategicdecisions to enter
recovering economies, such as FYR, they may be more
inclined to engage these countries, despite considerable
uncertainty.In turn,engagementcould increase tradeto the
region and likely render the region less uncertain;that is,
risk would be reduced.Consideringthe real-optionsvalue of
1These are just a few risks to which exporters and other international
marketersmay be exposed. For a furtherdelineation and classification of
risks faced by firms conducting business in international/foreignmarkets,
see Miller (1992), Kwok and Reeb (2000), Flynn and colleagues (1994),
and Reeb, Kwok, and Baek (1998).
2We base this conclusion on a series of in-depthinterviews (McCracken
1988) we conductedover a 12-yearperiod with membersof the food value
chain, government authorities, trade associations, and nongovernmental
organizationsthroughoutthe region, in the United States, and in the European Union (EU). However, we add that exports and other forms of trade
and investmentshould not be limited to food.
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an export ventureto the region may also stimulatepolicies
thathelp promotetradewith the region and, more generally,
tradewith recoveringeconomies, thus expediting recovery.
In light of the precedingtext, an objective of this research
is to evaluate the real-optionsvalue of potentialinvestment
in and export ventures to recovering economies. In doing
this, we also develop a systematic way of considering and
measuringrisks associated with an export ventureto countries in which scant data are available for quantifying the
uniquerisks of such a project.Furthermore,valuing options
that may be present in risky export ventures provides considerableinsight into the design of marketingstrategiesand
policies thatcould be used to enhancetradewith these countries, in particularthose thatcapitalizeon maintainingmanagerial flexibility in the presence of risk. Specifically, we
examine the case of an enterprisethat is evaluatingthe feasibility of entering the recovering countries of BosniaHerzegovina, Croatia, and Slovenia. We examine these
three countriesgiven the likely differences in both real and
perceivedrisks of conductingbusiness throughoutthe FYR.
Although the implicationsfrom our real-optionsanalysis
can apply to any recoveringeconomy, the countriesof FYR
are particularlycompelling and challenging because they
are (1) of sufficient size and sophisticationto be of interest
to most marketersand (2) still recoveringfrom various levels of war devastation(e.g., Glenny 2000; Pecotich, Renko,
and Shultz 1994; Shultz et al. 2005; Silber and Little 1997).
In some regions, that devastationmanifestsin profounddisruptionof infrastructure,production,and distributioncapabilities and can further exacerbate ethnic tensions, all of
which impede efficient markets and effective marketing
(e.g., WorldFactbook 2005a, b; cf. WorldFactbook 2005c;
see also World Bank 2006a, b, c). Yet in other regions-namely, Slovenia andthe developedcoastalregions of Croatia-the risks are likely not greater than traditionalEuropean Union (EU) trading partners. Furthermore, this
research presents a framework that managers can adapt
when consideringexport venturesnot only to FYR but also
to other recovering countries. In this spirit, we hope that
managers and policy makers will appreciate the options
value of these potential investments and that our analysis
will lead to additionaltrade in recovering economies and,
ultimately,to win-win incentives to sustainpeace and prosperity throughmutuallybeneficial commerce.
We organizethe remainderof this articleas follows: First,
we examine the recent literature on applications of real
options and apply a methodology for craftinga real-options
problemthatgives the exportingfirm the flexibility to abandon, expand,or contractthe marketingefforts in responseto
uncertainty.Second, we outline an efficient frameworkto
model the variabilityof cash flows to an export venture-a
key input in real-optionsanalysis-specifically focusing on
the uniqueand variedrisks of conductingbusiness in Slovenia, Croatia,and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Third,using general
assumptions,we estimate and presentthe real-optionsvalue
of conductingbusiness in each of these countries, and then
we consider how the real-options value may change by
varyingthe assumptionsof the real-optionsmodel. Examining how the real-optionsvalue changes under various scenarios for the inputs of the model provides considerable
insights into and recommendationsfor the design of marketing strategies and policies that may be effective in

enhancingtrade with recovering and emerging economies,
such as those in the FYR. In the final section, we summarize
our findings and implications,particularlyin terms of how
the value of these real options adds considerableinformation to the decision and policy-making process in the context of risky export ventures.

Analysis
Real-Options
Discounted cash flow analysis is the standardtool for evaluating the financialfeasibility of real investments(Brigham
and Houston2004). If the discountedfuturecash flows from
a project are greaterthan the initial investment,the net present value (NPV) is positive, which suggests that economic
gains to the firm would be realized if the projector investment were adopted.Although the risk of the projectis typically accounted for by means of a risk-adjusteddiscount
rate, traditional discounted cash flow techniques do not
inherentlyconsiderthe value of strategicoptions (i.e., managerial flexibility) in the presence of risk (Mun 2002).
In general, an option provides the right but not the obligation to take some form of actionat a specified time or over
a specified period. For example, a call option on an individual stock gives the holder of the option the right but not the
obligation to buy the stock at a particularprice-called the
exercise or strikeprice-over a set period (Hull 2000). This
option inherentlyhas value because the holder has the right
but not the obligationto invest in the stock at the strikeprice
(Black and Scholes 1973; Merton 1973).3Dixit andPindyck
(1994) suggest thatin the presenceof managerialflexibility,
investmentsin real assets containoptionvalues analogousto
that of financial assets. Specifically, an investmentcontains
real-options value if it contains an irreversible financial
commitment (i.e., sunk costs), uncertaintyin returnsover
time, and a unique opportunityto invest (Dixit 1989; Dixit
and Pindyck 1994; Richardsand Patterson2004).
A general result from options pricing theory is an understandingof the factors that drive an options value. Two of
the most importantdriversare the time to maturityand the
variabilityof the underlyingasset (Black and Scholes 1973;
Hull 2000; Merton 1973). For example, the longer the time
to invoke the option, the greater is the option value; the
more volatile the underlyingasset, the more valuable is the
option. Indeed, as we show in the next section, it is the
volatility of the underlyingasset thatbecomes the prominent
factor in real-options analysis. Combining the real-options
value of the investmentwith the resultfrom a traditionalstatic NPV analysis provides a more accurateestimate of the
truevalue of the investment,especially the inherentvalue of
managerialflexibility in the presence of uncertainty.
Applications are numerous,varied, and relevant to marketing and public policy. Dixit and Pindyck (1994) show
how to value undevelopedresourcereserves, environmental
policy design, and entryand exit strategies(see also Amram
3TheNobel Prize-winning researchof Black and Scholes (1973) defines
the value of call option on a dividend-payingstock to be a function of the
price of the underlyingasset (stock price), the strikeprice, the time to maturity of the option, the risk-freerateof return,and the volatility of the underlying stock price (see also Merton 1973). Althoughthis researchhas helped
foster the multibillion dollar financial derivatives industry, it has also
allowed both scholars and practitionersto apply similar option pricing
methods in valuing real options-namely, the option value inherentin real
investmentdecisions (Dixit and Pindyck 1994).
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and Kulatilaka 1999; Copeland and Antikarov 2001; Mun
2002). Otherapplicationsinclude investmenttiming, market
expansion and product development (e.g., Copeland and
Keenan 1998), customer relationships (Ward and Ryals
2001), and evaluation of brandextensions (Dias and Ryals
2002). Specifically, Dias and Ryals (2002, p. 116) note that
"for brand managers, flexibility such as the ability to
increase or decrease brandextension investmentdepending
on future circumstancesmight be very valuable indeed to
enable them to respond to changes in market circumstances." This line of thinking is consistent with that of a
marketerwho is consideringa new ventureinto a recovering
economy. Richards and Patterson (2002) further demonstrate that the uncertaintyrelated to marketingcommodity
exportscan have significantvalue.
Real-options analysis provides an ideal framework for
consideringrisky investmentdecisions, such as the decision
of whether to trade with a recovering economy. Instead of
viewing uncertainty as a negative, real-options analysis
views the ability to deal with uncertaintyas a positive. The
value of managerialflexibility, such as the option to expand
or contract marketingefforts after the investment is initiated, must be considered in addition to the NPV of the
investment at the time of the investment decision. Only
throughthe valuation of real options can the full potential
value of an investment decision be considered. In the following section, we develop the specific case of a food company thatis consideringinvestmentin a tradingventurewith
the recoveringeconomies of Slovenia, Croatia,and BosniaHerzegovina.

Methodology
Similar to other marketers (e.g., Franses 2005; Wittink
2005), we believe that there is some utility in modeling to
assist marketingand policy decision making. The development and articulationof our model and subsequentapplications follow.

andValuingRealOptions
Crafting
In considering the financial feasibility of entering into an
export venture with a recovering economy, managers are
likely to rely on discounted cash flow analysis-namely,
NPV analysis. The NPV is calculatedas follows:
(1)

NPV = -INVEST+

CF1

+ CF2

(1+i)1 (1+i)2

...CFn,

(1+i)n

where -INVEST is the initial investmentin the project,CFt
is the incrementalcash flow at time t (t = 1, ..., n), and i is
the risk-adjusted discount rate.4 The appropriate riskadjusteddiscount rate for a firm depends on many factors,
including the firm's cost of capital, debt structure,market
risk, and the perceived risks of the project under examination.5 That is, adjustingdiscount rates for risk reduces the
present value of future cash flows, thus providing a more
conservative NPV assessment. Although NPV is the stan4The use of risk-adjusteddiscountrates for internationalprojectsis consistent with the findings of Reeb, Kwok, and Baek (1998), who suggest that
despite reductionsin systematicrisk from diversification,risk-adjusteddiscount rates arejustified for internationalprojects.
5Fora discussion and methodsfor estimatingrisk-adjusteddiscountrates
in capitalbudgeting, see Brigham and Houston (2004).

dard metric for assessing any financial investment decision
and the standardpoint of departurefor real-optionsanalysis,
a most-probable-outcomeNPV resultingfrom decision tree
analysis or scenarioanalysis is also appropriate.Under conventional capital-budgetingdecision criteria,the decision to
enter the export marketwould be accepted if the NPV were
positive. That is, the present value of the projected cash
flows over the life of the export project is greaterthan the
initial investment, in theory providing the firm with an
instantaneousincreasein wealth throughthe adoptionof the
venture.Even in situationsin which NPV is projectedto be
positive, managementmay still be reluctantto engage in an
export venture with a country that is recovering from war
because of the substantialunknowns of enteringthese markets. However, considering the real-options value of the
projectwhen assessing initial financial feasibility-namely,
the value of managerialflexibility in the presence of uncertainty-should provide additional informationto management about the true value of this potential investment. Not
only does considering the real-optionsvalue of the investment in conjunction with the standardNPV provide management with a true understandingof the real value of the
investment considering its inherent volatility, but the realoptions value may also be enough incentive to persuade
managementto engage in the project.Thus, the truevalue of
the export venture,consideringits real-optionsvalue, is
NPV+ Real-options
value.
(2)
In illustratingthe differences in real-options value, we
consider Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. For
example, the Slovenian economy is robust, and in 2004, it
joined the EU. This is mainly because Slovenia escaped
much of the carnage during the wars of the 1990s. At the
other extreme, Bosnia-Herzegovina is still reeling from the
effects of war and economic devastation.Although conceivably numerousoptions can be valued in the context of a firm
consideringan exportventurein these countries,the specific
real-optionsproblem we examine and apply here is that of
the option to choose among various courses of action after
the ventureis initiated;this is often referredto as a "chooser
option" (Copeland and Antikarov2001; Mun 2002). Thus,
managementhas the option (choice) to expand the export
venture,scale back marketingefforts, or abandonthe export
venture anytime during the project's life.6 Although it is
well known from option pricing theory that the longer the
option is available,the greateris the option value, we define
the anticipatedlength of the export venture (and the option
to choose) as six years. Although management would
undoubtedlyview a successful long-termexportrelationship
to returnpositive cash flows considerablybeyond six years,
this time frameis reasonableto considerinitial financialfeasibility of the project and the chooser option under examination.7 Another important consideration for the real6The considerationof these actions (abandonment,expansion, contraction, or staying the course) is not related to a particularproject design or
marketingplan, nor do we assign specific probabilitiesto these actions.
These are merely responses to uncertaintyor risk that are likely to exist in
an export venture to a recovering economy. Provided that management
indeed is ensuredthe flexibility to respondto this risk, ex ante real-options
value should exist in the presenceof a potentiallyrisky investment.
7In a case study examining the financial feasibility of introducing a
value-addedfood productto an export market,Henley and Sanders(1994)
estimate the cash flows to the ventureover a six-year period.
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optionsvalue,especiallywhenan exportventureto a counis
try recoveringfromdevastationis underconsideration,
thatflexibilityin managingthe ventureis ensured.This is
possibleby consideringspecificmarketingstrategieswith
built-inflexibilityin a particular
projectdesign,as well as
thepromotionof publicpoliciesthatpromoteflexibilityand
If managersdo
risk taking(e.g., exportcreditguarantees).
value
nothavetheflexibilityto respondto risk,real-options
essentiallydisappears.
Giventhe complexnatureof a chooseroption,we use a
binomialoptionpricingmodelwith risk-neutral
probabilities (Cox,Ross,andRubinstein1979).Forcomplexoptions,
such as thatwhichwe outlinehere,binomialmethodsare
moreflexible.Theyaremoreintuitiveandeasierto convey
to management
andotherdecisionmakersthanclosed-form
solutions and differentialequationmethods (Dixit and
Pindyck1994;Mun2002; RichardsandPatterson2004).8
Whenbinomialmethodsare used in valuingreal options,
two binomiallatticesareneeded---onethatshowsthe evolutionof the underlyingassetandone to derivethe option
value.The followinginformation
is also neededto valuea
realoption:theoption'sstrikeprice(X), thepresentvalueof
the underlyingasset(So),the timeto maturityof the option
(t), the risk-freerate of interest(r), and the volatilityor
annualizedstandard
deviationof the underlyingasset(a).
Figure1 shows the binomiallatticefor the underlying
asset,So;we developthisfollowingHull's(2000)specification.Here,theunderlyingassetSoreflectsthepresentvalue
of thefuturecashflowsto theexportventure.Thisbinomial
latticeevolvesoversix years,commensurate
withtheinitial
8Hull(2000)andMun(2002)showthatbinomialmethodsshouldprovidesimilarrealoptionsto closed-form
solutions(e.g.,BlackandScholes's
[1973]pricingmethods).In the limit,binomialandclosed-formmethods
shouldbe equal(Hull2000).

Figure1.

life of the investmentandthe optionsdefined.Theu andd
representthe up anddownstepsin the binomiallattice;we
definedthisas
u = ea,

(3)

d = e-

where,again,a is the volatilityof the futurecashflows to
theexportproject,e is theexponential
function,andAtis the
numberof incremental
timestepsdesignatedperyear.If we
assumeonly one timestepperyear,thenAt= 1.9Note that
the downfactor,d, is alsotheinverseof theup factor(1/u).
Thus,the underlyinglatticein Figure1 illustrateshow So
canpotentiallyevolveovertime,dependingon thepredicted
volatilityof theprojectrepresented
by a.
Figure2 showsthe equitylatticefor the chooseroption,
withtheunderlying
latticein
whichis neededin conjunction
Figure1 to find the real-optionsvalue.FollowingMun's
we usetheendnodesof theequitylattice
(2002)procedures,
to reflectthe maximumvalueof abandonment,
expansion,
or stayingthe coursefor the chooseroption.In
contraction,
general,eachendnodeof theequitylatticecanbe expressed
as follows:
(4)

Max[Il,

I2, 034],4

where D1Ito (44reflectthe net valueto eachof the options
considered.For(1, thenetvalueof theoptionis simplythe

salvage value that would be obtained from abandonment.
That is, we assume that that the firm can recover at least a
portion of its yearly variable production and marketing
costs. The value of the expansionoption, 02, is
(5)
(D2= ai - C,
9Thetermt

is an adjustment
to annualize
thestandard
deviation,a.

BinomialLatticeof UnderlyingVariable:PresentValueof CashFlows(So)

Sou6
Sou5

1-SouSd

Sou4

Sou4d

Sou3%
Sou2
Sou
So

Sou4d2

Sou3d
Sou3d2

Sou2d

SSou3d3

Sou2d2

Soud

Sod

=-

S~Soud2
Sod2

Souu2d3

Soud3
Sod3

Sou2d4
Soud4
SoudS5

SSod4

Sod5s

u = eo JA (upfactor)

Sod6

d = e-(A = -1 (downfactor)
e = exponentialfunction

So= presentvalueoffuturecashflows
a = standard
of discounted
deviation
cash flows
-At = timefactor
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Figure2.

EquityLatticeof the Optionto Choose:Abandonment,Expansion,Contraction,or StatusQuo

EndNodes

Nodes
Intermediate
Induction)
(Backward
Each end node = Max[()1, 2,1(3, (94], where (1) is the value of the abandonmentoption,
option,and
(D2is the valueof the expansionoption,(43 is the valueof the contraction
courseof action.
()4 reflectsstayingwiththe original
Each intermediatenode = Max[()1,(D2,13, (14,Q], where (1) to ()4 are defined as before,
+ (1 - p)Vd],wheree is the exponential
and Q = e-rAt[pVu
function,r is the risk-free
down
1
is
the
the
is
rateof interest,p
probability,
Vuis the value
upprobability, p
of the previousupnode,andVdis the valueof the previousdownnode.

where a is the amount that sales are expected to expand
(e.g., a = 2 indicates a doubling of sales), ri is the value
taken from the correspondingend node in the underlying
lattice (Figure 1), and c is the cost of expansion. Similarly,
the option to scale back marketing efforts, 03, can be
expressed as follows:
(6)

()3

= fr1i+ S,

where P is the amount that sales are expected to contract
from the scaling back efforts (e.g., P= .5 indicates a reduction of sales by 50%) and s is the cost savings from reducing marketingefforts. Finally, the option to stay the course,
04, is merely the value in the correspondingnode of the
underlyinglattice (ri).
After we calculate the end nodes of the equity lattice, we
use backwardinductionto find the intermediatenodes of the
equity lattice. The intermediatenodes are all nodes to the
left of the end nodes in the equity lattice (Figure2). In doing
this, it is necessary to calculate risk-neutralizedprobabilities. Using both the up and down factors examinedin Equation 3, we determinethatthe probabilityof an up movement
on the binomial lattice is equal to
(7)

ert -d

p

-

,

where e is the exponentialfunction,r is the risk-freeinterest
rate,At is the numberof time steps (At = 1), and u and d are
the up and down factors,respectively, as shown in Equation
3. Thus, the probabilityof a down movement on the binomial lattice is merely 1 - p. When we use these riskneutralizedprobabilities and backward induction, each of
the intermediatenodes can be expressed as follows:
(8)
Max[1l, 02, )3,0)4, E],
where
02, 03, and D04are defined as before and Q is
01,

(9)

= erAt [PVu + (1

)Vd],

where, again, e is the exponentialfunction, r is the risk-free
rate of interest,p is the risk-neutralizedup probability,1 - p
is the risk-neutralizeddown probability,Vuis the value of
the previous up node, and Vdis the value of the previous
down node. Moving from right to left on the lattice ultimately leads back to the first node in the equity lattice. Following this backwardinductionprocedure,the value of the
first node of the equity lattice reflects the present value of
futurecash flows to the project,given the combined options
to abandon,expand, scale back, or stay the course. Therefore, the real-optionsvalue is merely the differencebetween
the value in the first node in the equity lattice in Figure 2,
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Vo, and the static present value of the future cash flow
stream,So (Vo - So = Real-optionsvalue).10
Indeed, it is a that ultimately drives the real-options
result.Fromoptionspricingtheory,a positive relationshipis
known to exist between volatility (a) and the value of an
option. Although, at first glance, this suggests that highly
risky projectsimply greaterreal-optionsvalue, this is not the
case. Ex ante real-optionsvalue exists only if there is flexibility in the projectdesign itself such that managementcan
respond to uncertainty.If this flexibility does not exist, the
option value is essentially zero. Furthermore,ex post realoptions value (after the project is engaged) may decline or
even go to zero if the risks consideredex ante do not materialize or if the flexibility to respondto risk is somehow constrained.This is similar to how financial options may lose
value over time if the level or the volatility of the underlying
financial asset changes. Meaningful estimates or forecasts
of a, usually based on historical data, are also needed to
assess real-options value adequately. However, deriving
estimates of a associated with the cash flows of a new
exportventureto a recoveringcountryis difficult, given that
thereis likely no historyof similartransactionsand an overall paucity of publicly available,high-qualitydata to derive
such an estimate. Despite this, the incorporationof Monte
Carlo simulationmethods,coupled with existing knowledge
of risk assessment and classification presentedin the internationalbusiness literature,can be used to capturerobustly
the likely risks associated with an export ventureinto FYR
in an estimate of a.
The preceding binomial option pricing model is an efficient method of estimating the real-options value of an
export venture (specifically, the chooser option defined) at
the time of the investmentdecision. Therefore,the binomial
option pricing model should not be confused with the traditional decision tree analysis often used in projectvaluation.
Althoughbinomialoption pricing and decision tree analysis
appear similar, they are indeed different. Decision tree
analysis is importantfor graphicallydepicting strategicinitiatives and strategiesover time. Thatis, decision tree analysis illustrates the strategic pathways that a firm can take
throughoutthe course of the project.Decision trees are also
useful in comparingalternativedesigns of a project.Identifying and understandingthe decision points in the project,
the natureof the decisions to be made, and the costs/benefits
and probabilities associated with each outcome and each
node of a decision tree lattice provide criticalinformationto
the decision maker. Depending on the specific project
design, theremay be strategicoptions thatneed to be valued
at each node in a comprehensive decision tree that thoroughly analyzes all strategic decisions. This may be the
most importantcomplementaryaspect of the two methods.
In this case, binomial option pricing methods (which we
presented previously) can be used to value certain real
options that may be available at differentdecision nodes in

10Binomial option pricing methods incorporate recombining lattices
(Cox, Ross, and Rubinstein1979; Hull 2000). Therefore,it is importantnot
to confuse the binomialoption pricingmethod shown here, which is explicitly used to value the real option, with traditionaldecision tree analysis,
which may or may not incorporaterecombininglattices.

a comprehensiveprojectdesign.1l However, it is important
to rememberthe differences between relating options pricing, as we describedpreviously, to actualprojectdesign and
implementation.

forEstimating
Risk
MonteCarloSimulation
In the context of internationaltrade, numerousfactors are
likely to create variabilityin the project's cash flow stream.
Researchershave suggested many alternativeways to classify these risks (Flynnet al. 1994; Miller 1992; Reeb, Kwok,
and Baek 1998). For example, Miller (1992) takes a general
managementview of risks and develops three major categories of interrelateduncertainties:general environmental
uncertainties, industry uncertainties, and firm uncertainties.12Generalenvironmentaluncertaintiesfocus on the factors that affect all industries,including political uncertainties (e.g., war, political turmoil), government policy
uncertainties(e.g., price controls,traderestrictions),macroeconomic uncertainties (e.g., inflation, foreign exchange
risks, changes in relative prices), social uncertainties(e.g.,
social unrest), and naturaluncertainties(e.g., naturaldisasters). Underindustryuncertainties,Miller develops subclassifications reflecting risk factors that are specific to the
industrythat the firm operates-namely, uncertaintiesarising from the inputmarketor the productmarketor competitive uncertainties.Specific examples of these risks include
changes in market supply, miscalculations of market
demandand productacceptance,and competition.The classification of firm uncertaintiesare relatedto the risk factors
that are firm specific, including delays in payment,culturebased misunderstandings,unreliable third parties, transportationbottlenecks, problems with customs brokers, and
other issues that may disruptproductflow and payment.
Flynn and colleagues (1994) note that many people view
Miller's (1992) general environmentaluncertaintiesas the
most importantdriversof volatility, encompassingmany, if
not most, of the aforementionedrisks. Indeed, it is likely
that most managersimmediatelyconsider these risks when
evaluatingdecisions to introducea new productto a recovering region. Although numerous commercial rating services providepolitical risk assessmentsandrelatedinformation designed for exporters,which attemptto gauge these
risks (e.g., Dun & Bradstreet),accordingto Oetzel, Bettis,
and Zenner (2000), these country risk measures, though
informative in general, provide little value in predicting
periods of majorinstabilityin a country.Although it is clear
that numerousrisks drive the variabilityof cash flows, these
risks are difficult to quantifyand predictwith any precision.
For example, what is the probabilitythat war will breakout
again in Bosnia-Herzegovina, that product will be lost in
transit,or that infrastructurebottleneckswill delay delivery
of the product and jeopardize a key business relationship
with an importer?
11Mun(2002, pp. 242-45) details the differences in real-optionsvaluation versus that of decision tree analysis, as well as how the two forms of
analysis can be used togetherto conductcomplex projectdecision anddecision analysis.
12Flynnand colleagues (1994) and Reeb, Kwok, and Baek (1998) provide alternativeclassifications of risk, but they are similar in concept to
Miller's (1992) taxonomy of risks.
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Copeland and Antikarov (2001) note that Monte Carlo
simulationprovides a robustmethodof incorporatingmultiple risks to arrive at a single measure of the volatility of
future discounted cash flows, a, to use in the valuation of
real options;they suggest thatonly threeor fourkey risk drivers need to be explicitly modeled to keep the simulation
robustand tractable.Following this suggestion, we develop
a Monte Carlo simulation model to derive an ex ante estimate of the variabilityof cash flows of an export ventureto
the countries of Slovenia, Croatia, and BosniaHerzegovina.We assume that each of the following factors
drives the variability of future cash flows to the venture:
price, quantity sold, major disruptions, and foreign
exchange rates. Focusing on these factorskeeps the simulation tractableand also adequatelyand robustlycapturesthe
influence of the myriadrisk factorsthatpreviousresearchers
have identified.
In estimatingthe future cash flows of an export venture,
a firm usually has some estimate of the price that it will
charge for the product,the quantityof the productit anticipates selling, and the costs associated with producing and
marketingthe product.These factors are unique and depend
on the specific productmarketedand the unique cost structure of the firm, and knowledge of these factorsis criticalin
estimating the expected cash flows to an export venture.
However, the Monte Carlo simulation model we develop
here is general enough to estimate the variability of cash
flows (a) for any exportventureinto a developing or emerging economy.13
We make the following baseline assumptions in the
Monte Carlo simulation,and then we apply the risk factors
examinedin the next section to this base case, dependingon
the countryexamined. First, we assume that both price and
quantityare one, such thatrevenue (price x quantity)is also
one.14 Second, we assume that variable costs to the export
venture are a fixed 80% of total sales. Because fixed costs
do not vary with the quantityof sales, we do not explicitly
model fixed costs. Therefore,we assume thatthe cash flows
to the project for each year are revenue less costs.15Third,
we assume that the initial life of the export venture under
consideration is six years. We conduct the Monte Carlo
simulationusing 10,000 iterations;therefore,we incorporate
almost every conceivable scenario,providinga robustsimulation of the discountedcash flows. Thus, with each drawin
the simulation, we estimate new values for the cash flows
13Fora detailed explanationof Monte Carlo simulationmethods for use
in real-options analysis, see Mun (2002) and Copeland and Antikarov
(2001). The @RISKprogramis an Excel add-in programcommonly used
by financialanalyststo incorporaterisk in financialmodeling, and it is used
to programthe Monte Carlo simulationmodel used in this research.
14Becausea is an estimate of the standarddeviationof returns,r, defined
in Equation10, andreturnsare percentages,only the variabilityof price and
quantityis importantin its calculation.Therefore,the levels of prices and
quantity sold are immaterialfrom a mathematicalperspective in the estimation of r and a. The assumption that both price and quantity equal 1
allows for simplicity in modeling.
15Accountingrevenue arguably does not equal cash flow. Noncash
expenses, such as depreciation,are routinely added back to net income in
determiningthe relevantcash flows to an investmentproject.However, this
model focuses on the variabilityof cash flows from the exportingventure.
Cash flows that are uniquerelativeto a firm's accountingpractices,such as
depreciation,are firm specific and are not likely to be influenced by risks
inherentin exportingto an emerging market.

for Periods 1-6 (CFI-CF6) of the project, and we discount
these cash flows using a risk-adjusted discount rate of
15%.16 From this simulated discounted cash flow stream,
we estimate a as the standard deviation of r defined as
follows:
(10)

r=lnInPVI+
CF1PV
PVo

where PV1 is the currentvalue of futurecash flows in Period
1, CF1 is the cash flow (not discounted) at Year 1, and PVo
is the currentvalue of discountedcash flows at Year 0. As
Mun (2002) suggests, only PV1 and CF1 are stochastic in
Equation 10, whereas PVo is the static present value of the
future cash flow stream. That is, at the completion of the
10,000 iterationsof the Monte Carlo simulation, a distribution of r is produced,and we use the standarddeviation of
this distribution,a, in the binomial option pricing model.
Given this baseline model, we incorporatethe following
major risk factors in considering export ventures to Slovenia, Croatia,and Bosnia-Herzegovina:price, quantitysold,
major disruptions,and foreign exchange risks. In the following sections, we describehow these factors are modeled.

Price
We designate price as a stochastic input variable in the
Monte Carlo simulation. For each country modeled, we
assume that the initial export selling price of $1.00 grows at
4% per year, consistent with average inflation witnessed
duringthe past decade. The initial $1.00 price assumes stable exchange rates; thus, it reflects the relative price of the
good in both the exportingand the importingcountry.However, a distributionaroundthe trend inflation rate of 4% is
establishedto accountfor uncertaintyin this price point over
time. We assume thatthe distributionaroundthe price trend
is lognormal;the mean of the distributionis set at the previous period's price, and the standarddeviation of the distribution is the standarddeviation of historical exchange rate
returnsof the specific importingcountry (foreign currency/
U.S. dollar)for the period of 1995-2003 (13% for Slovenia,
12%for Croatia,and 8.8% for Bosnia-Herzegovina).17We
assume that the distributionaroundthe trend is lognormal
because (1) the lognormaldistributionis commonly used to
describe financial asset returns, such as foreign exchange
ratereturnsthatwe used to createthe distributionaroundthe
trend, and (2) the lognormal distribution has a slightly
longer and narrowerright tail than the normal distribution.
This is consistent with most price behavior. That is, prices
tend to be sticky downwardbut not upward.
The preceding method preserves the constant trend in
price (4%) but also places a range aroundthe price trendto
account for variabilityin the price over time. Although it is
16Tofocus on the primaryfactors that drive the variabilityof the cash
flows from the export venture only, we assume that the risk-adjusteddiscount rate is fixed at 15%.We use this risk-adjusteddiscount ratefor illustrative purposes.A firm's unique risk-adjusteddiscount rate is a function
of its cost of capital, capital structure,marketrisk, and projectrisks.
17Beforethe introductionof the euro, the Bosnian mark was pegged to
the Germanmarkand is now effectively pegged to the euro. Therefore,the
8.8% standarddeviationnoted for Bosina-Herzegovinareflects the annualized standarddeviation of euro/$ exchange rate returnsfrom the launch of
the euro in 2002-2003.
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reasonablethatpriceincreaseslinearlythroughtime with
inflation,it is alsoreasonableto assumethatpricescharged
by theexportermayneedto be raisedorloweredin response
to various factors-namely, exchange rate volatility.
Indeed,exchangerate fluctuationsmay actuallylower or
raisethe priceof the exportedgood in the importingcountry. If exchangeratemovementsare suchthatthe priceof
the goodin the importingcountryincreases,it maybe necessary for the exporterto lower its invoice price to the
importerto keeppricesin theimportingcountrystable.It is
also likely thatover time,the exporterwill need to adjust
pricesto accountfor changesin the supplyanddemandof
theproductin theimportingcountrythatmayor maynotbe
due to changesin the exchangerate.Therefore,the procein pricesover
durereasonablyaccountsfor the uncertainty
timethatmaybe causedby severalfactors.

Sold
Quantity
We also designatequantitysold as stochasticin the Monte
Carlosimulation.It is likely to fluctuategreatlyovertime
for severalreasons,includingacceptanceof the productin
the importingmarket,increasedor decreaseddemandfor
the productover time, competitiveresponse,the strength
andsuccessof businessrelationships
alongthesupplychain,
andso forth.Moreover,largecurrencydevaluations
in the
importingcountrymaycauselocal demandfor the product
to fall greatly,thusreducingthequantityof theproductsold
in a givenyear.Conversely,anappreciation
of thelocalcurrencyrelativeto the dollarmayinducegreaterdemandfor
the importedproduct.
We begin with the quantitysold as one, and we allow
quantitysoldthroughtimeto takeon threedifferentannual
growthtrendswith equalprobabilityof occurrencein the
MonteCarlosimulation:
rapidgrowth,moderategrowth,or
declininggrowth.We assumethesegrowthtrendsfor each
of the countriesunderexamination.For rapidgrowth,we
in which
designatethe growthrateas a uniformdistribution
the rate can rangefrom 15%to 45%. The moderateand
declininggrowthratesarealsodesignatedas uniformdistributions.Formoderategrowth,the valuesrangefrom2%to
10%and,fordeclininggrowth,from-10%to -1%. Thus,at
any given iterationof the simulation,rapid,moderate,or
with the unidecliningannualgrowthratescommensurate
formdistributions
established
haveanequalchanceof being
drawn.Theuniformdistribution
is appropriate
forconsiderof occuring a rangeof valuesthathaveanequalprobability
rence. Although there may be cases in which management
has informationor prior experiences that suggest that the
distributionof potentialgrowthrates is not uniform,a range
of growth rates with equal probabilityof occurrencepicks
up the considerableuncertaintysurroundingthe quantityof
goods that are likely to be sold into a marketthat is recovering from devastation.Furthermore,we place a distribution
around the growth trend to account for variability in the
trendover time. We assume that this distributionis normal;
the mean is the previous year's quantitysold, and the standarddeviation is 2% for Year 1 and increases 1% annually
for Years 2-6. Thus, the uncertaintyaroundthe trendquantity sold increases as the time horizon increases. Because
there is no guidance or experience available in determining
the appropriatedistributionto use in establishing a cone of
uncertaintyarounda trend variable, such as quantity sold,

is a safeassumption
andis robustfor
thenormaldistribution
a
variable.
variation
around
trend
Althoughthe
establishing
around
about
distribution
the
trend
aresubthe
assumptions
considervariabilityin quantitysold
jective,theyadequately
overtime.In essence,it is nearlyimpossibleto predictthe
quantityof productsoldovertimewithanydegreeof accuwe
racy over the long run,so the simulationassumptions
in
the
account
for
the
that
arise
here
variability may
present
cashflowsovertimedueto thequantityof productsoldinto
the respectivecountry.We alsoconsidercosts, whichfluctuatewiththequantityof productsold (e.g.,variablecosts),
andfix themat 80%of totalsalesrevenue;however,costs
arelikelyto be considerably
higherif thereis a majordisruptionin theexportventure.

MajorDisruptions
Whenconsideringthelaunchof a newproductintoa recovis likelyto considerthe worst
eringeconomy,management
scenario,namely,majordisruptionsto the ongoingexport
venturethat could eventuallybringharmto the venture
In a
itself,as well as to the entirefirmandits stakeholders.
thesemajordisruptions
MonteCarlosimulationframework,
arelikely to be eventsthatarenot capturedby the normal
stochasticmodelingof priceandquantitywe describedin
the previoustwo sections.Forexample,delaysin payment,
or even defaultin paymentby an importcustomer,would
to the pointthatthe
likelystrainthe marketing
relationship
relationshipwouldbe severed.Similarly,key importcustomersmaybecomedissatisfiedwithaspectsof theexporter
anddecideto severtherelationship.
Lossof productdueto
of
lack
infrastructure,
corruption,
poor
properproducthanand
is
also
For
foodprodtheft
a
concern.
a
dling,
perishable
uct, lapsesin properproducthandingcould createa food
to the extent
safetyscarethatmaydamagebrandreputation
thatconsumerdemandfortheproductis effectivelyreduced
local andnationalgovernmental
to zero.Furthermore,
conbusitrolsmaymakeit difficultto completeaninternational
ness transactionsuccessfullyor may disruptan ongoing
withan importer.Othermajordisruptions
relationship
may
be causedby instabilitiesin the local andnationalgovernment,the bankingsystemof the destinationcountry,political strife,and,in theworstcase,a resurgenceof war.
Giventhatpoliticalriskstendto be muchmoresystematic
in nature,Oetzel,Bettis, and Zenner(2000) suggestthat
politicalrisksareoftenencompassedin currencyexchange
ratefluctuations.However,manyof the risksoutlinedare
nonsystematicin natureand likely are not capturedby
exchange rate fluctuations. Indeed, major disruptions are
likely to representunique shocks to the cash flow stream
that could create considerablevariabilityof discountedcash
flows; these may best be modeled by a jump diffusion
process (Richardsand Patterson2004). However, modeling
a jump diffusion process requiresa considerableamountof
historicaldata (e.g., firm-level exporttransactiondata to the
FYR) to pick up and model the shocks that the firm may
have realized in the past. For a firm in the initial stages of
consideringan exportrelationshipto the FYR, or perhapsto
any recovering region, data of this nature do not exist.
Therefore, we explicitly model major disruptions in the
Monte Carlo simulation.
The Dun & BradstreetExporters'Encyclopedia(see Dun
& Bradstreet 2001) publishes information useful for
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exporters,includinginformationon creditand paymentconditions, such as local delays and foreign exchange delays.
Local delays representthe average time beyond the designated payment terms that an importer in the destination
countrydelays the deposit of paymentin its local bank. Foreign exchange delays reflect the average time between the
deposit of funds in a local (foreign) bank and receipt of
funds by the exporter.Both measuresprovide at least some
informationaboutthe nonsystematicrisks we discussed previously-namely, risks that affect payment. For Croatia,
local delays ranged from one to three months, and foreign
exchange delays also rangedfrom one to threemonths.Furthermore,Dun & Bradstreetsuggested that new importcustomers should obtain letters of credit, but more flexible
termscould be used for establishedcustomers.For Slovenia,
local delays were reportedbetween zero and two months,
and foreign exchange delays were reportedbetween zero
and one month.Local and foreign exchange delays were not
reportedfor Bosnia-Herzegovina, but local delays and foreign exchange delays for Ukraine were reportedbetween
four and five months, and letters of credit were recommended for all customers, both new and established.
Although Ukraine is not part of the FYR and has not
recently suffered the atrocities of civil war, it representsa
transitioningeconomy because it is recoveringfrom marked
political upheaval; furthermore,it is rated as a very-highrisk country by Dun & Bradstreet(2002). Thus, the information for Ukraineis likely to be similarto that of BosniaHerzegovina,thoughthe absence of such datafrom BosniaHerzegovinahints at even greaterrisk. On the basis of local
delays, foreign exchange delays, and the fact that Slovenia
is now partof the EU and has sufferedlittle damage during
the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s, Slovenia is likely to have
the smallest probabilityof a major disruption;conversely,
Bosnia-Herzegovina is likely to have the largest.
In the Monte Carlo simulation,we assume thatif a major
disruptionoccurs, a considerablereductionin top-line revenue will be realized. Although many exportersare likely to
use some form of productpayment insurance,a major disruptioncould cause serious problems, such as the severing
of a customerrelationship,which would cause a majorloss
in income for that year. However, this reductionin top-line
revenue is likely to differ from country to country. For
example, if a majordisruptionwere to occur in Slovenia, the
impactto revenue would be much less severe and temporary
than in, for example, Bosnia-Herzegovina. Therefore, we
model reduction in revenue using a uniform distribution,
ranging between -1% and -10% for Slovenia, -2% and
-20% for Croatia, and -5% and -50% for BosniaHerzegovina.The uniform distributionis appropriatewhen
modeling ranges in which values within the ranges are
assumed to have an equal probabilityof occurrence.In the
case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, for example, if a major disruption were to occur, reduction in revenue would be
between -5% and-50%, and any value within this rangehas
an equal chance of being drawnin the simulation.In modeling majordisruptionsthemselves, we use subjective probabilities that incorporatethe Dun & Bradstreetlocal delay
and foreign exchange delay measuresas guides. For Slovenia, we assume that there is a 95% chance of no major disruptionand a 5% chance of a majordisruption.For Croatia,
we assume thatthereis a 70% chance of no majordisruption

and a 30%chance of a majordisruption.Finally, for Bosnia,
we assume that thereis a 60% chance of a majordisruption
and a 40% chance of no majordisruption.
Although top-line revenues are likely to suffer during
times of a major disruption,increased costs to the export
venture are also likely to be realized. Indeed, the firm will
likely incur considerablecosts in attemptingto collect payment, reestablishcustomers,negotiate contractsand contingencies, travel, and so forth. Thus, when a majordisruption
is realized in the Monte Carlo simulation, variable costs
increase as well. Similar to the impact on top-line revenue,
the costs associated with remedying a major disruptionare
likely to be considerablyless for a more developed country,
such as Slovenia, than for a less developed country,such as
Bosnia-Herzegovina. As described previously, we assume
thatvariablecosts are 80%of revenue and thatthey increase
by 1%-10% for Slovenia, 2%-25% for Croatia, and 5%30% for Bosnia-Herzegovina in the case of a majordisruption; the ranges for the cost increase are representedby a
uniform distribution.Again, with Bosnia-Herzegovina as
the example, if a major disruption were to occur, costs
would increase anywhere between 5% and 30%, and there
would be the equal probabilityof occurrenceunderthe uniform distribution.

Risk
Exchange
Foreign
Oetzel, Bettis, and Zenner (2000) use shocks in foreign
exchange rates (foreign currency/U.S.dollar) as a proxy for
political risk. If exchange rates are floating and foreign
exchange marketsare efficient, the exchange rate between
two countriesshouldreflect factorsthatdrive the supply and
demandfor the foreign currency,including macroeconomic
and political factors. It is difficult to model explicitly the
changes in value that arise because of general exchange rate
fluctuations in a given period (e.g., year). Each individual
exporttransactionis exposed to exchange ratevolatility, and
this volatility can be managed with various risk management approaches (e.g., Butler 2004; Henley and Sanders
1994; Jacque 1981).
Althoughwe captureroutineexchange ratefluctuationsin
the modeling of price in the Monte Carlo simulation,a bigger concern is how large devaluations in foreign currency
relative to the U.S. dollar affect the demand for imports in
the destination country. Large devaluations in currency,
defined as devaluations greater than 20% (Oetzel, Bettis,
and Zenner 2000), are rare events (shocks) and should be
modeled as such. The standarddeviation aroundprice trend
that we describedpreviously is consistent with the standard
deviationof relativehistoricalexchange rate changes for the
countriesexamined,but it does not consider explicit shocks
to the exchange rate regimes (e.g., Oanda Corporation
2003). Moreover, Bosnia-Herzegovina has a fixed
exchange rate mechanism that is tied directly to the euro.
Thus, the risk with a fixed exchange rate mechanismis that
the foreign government (e.g., the Bosnian government)
devalues the currencyrelative to the pegged currency,disrupting the Bosnian mark/U.S. dollar exchange rate and
potentiallymakingU.S. importsmore expensive to BosniaHerzegovina consumers. Indeed, major devaluations of
recentyears (e.g., the devaluationof the Argentinepeso) has
greatly increased the price of U.S. goods and services in
Argentina;we revisit this comparisonsubsequently.
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We specify the potential for exchange rate shocks in the
Monte Carlo simulation. From 1995 to 2003, year-to-year
exchange rate returns did not exceed 20% for Slovenia;
therefore, we do not model exchange rate shocks for this
country. However, from 1999 to 2000, the Croatiankuna
lost approximately21% of its value, constitutingone major
devaluationfrom 1995 to 2003. Given thatthe Bosnian currency is pegged to the euro, we use historicalexchange rate
data for the Argentine peso (1995-2003) to define the
probabilityof a majordevaluationin a fixed exchange rate
regime. Over this time span, there was one major devaluation in the Argentinepeso relative to the U.S. dollar, which
occurredin January2002, from which time the Argentine
peso was allowed to float freely relative to the dollar. Following this, we designate that there is a one-eighth chance
of devaluationoccurring(i.e., from 1995 to 2003, one major
devaluation occurred) in both the Croatian kuna and the
Bosnian markrelative to the U.S. dollar. If a majordevaluation occurs at any iterationof the Monte Carlo simulation,
we assume that revenues are reducedby 20%-50% following a uniform distribution,a likely result due to the likely
decreaseddemandfor U.S. imports.Again, the uniformdistributionis appropriatein this case because a range of values is established, and we assume that all percentages
between these ranges have an equal probabilityof occurrence if a major devaluationis realized. Although a large
devaluationin the U.S. dollar relative to these foreign currencies may influence consumers in the importingcountry
to purchase U.S. exports-a likely scenario as the dollar
continues to weaken in world currencymarkets-the more
relevant downside risk to an exporteris that of the foreign
currencydeclining in value relative to the U.S. dollar.

Results
Table 1 presents the estimated a for Slovenia (.369, or
36.9%), Croatia(.419, or 41.9%), and Bosnia-Herzegovina
(.716, or 71.6%). Not surprisingly,Bosnia-Herzegovinahas
the highest standarddeviation of annual discounted cash
flows. Indeed, although any export venture is risky, most
exporterswould view a 72% annual standarddeviation in
discountedcash flows as an indicationof unrulyrisk at best.
However, the considerationof the real-optionsvalue in light
of this risk provides considerableinsight into the inherent
value of this volatility, especially in the presence of managerial flexibility.
To make the results generaland ultimatelyto drawpolicy
and marketing implications from the real-options values
estimated,we assume the following for the chooser option:
The present value of future cash flows, So, is $100,000.
Therefore, from a static NPV perspective, if So is greater
than the initial investment for the export venture, NPV is
positive, and managementshould engage in the project.For

the option to abandon,we assume that the salvage value is
$50,000. If managementdeems a pullout to be necessary
over the six-year initial life of the venture,the firm will be
able to recover or save $50,000 from its actions. In considering the option to expand, we assume that the expansion
factor, (a, in Equation5 is 2 and that expansion costs, c, are
$50,000, such that expansion efforts will realize a twofold
increase in sales but cost the firm an additional $50,000.
Similarly, in considering the option to reduce or contract
marketingefforts, Pin Equation6 is .5, so that a reduction
in marketingefforts will realize a decrease in sales by 50%
but will come at a cost savings, s, of $25,000. Each individual exporting firm will have its own costs and unique
assumptionsfor the chooser option, depending on the specific design for the projectas determinedbefore engaging in
the venture, but the general assumptionswe present here,
with the estimates of a presentedin Table 1 for Slovenia,
Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina, provide baseline realoptions values that can be furtherexamined.
Table 2 presents the real-optionsvalues for export ventures to Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina based
on the foregoing assumptions. The real-options value is
$70,090 for Slovenia, $74,010 for Croatia,and $96,707 for
Bosnia-Herzegovina. For illustrative purposes, Figure 3
shows both the underlyingand the equity lattice for the case
of Bosnia-Herzegovina;the real-optionsvalue of $96,707 is
the difference between the initial node on the equity lattice
and the initial node on the underlyinglattice, respectively.
Consistent with option pricing theory (e.g., Black and
Scholes 1973; Cox, Ross, and Rubinstein1979; Hull 2000),
the larger the a, the larger is the real-optionsvalue, when
all other factors are held constant. These results confirm
this theory and, if we hold all other assumptionsconstant,
show that the export venturewith the highest estimate of a
(Bosnia-Herzegovina) has the highest real-options value,
whereas Slovenia, the least risky venture, has the lowest.
Moreover, the results are compelling from an export marketing and development perspective; indeed, they suggest
thatthereis considerablevalue in the presenceof risk, especially if managementhas the ability to adapt to this risk
throughflexible marketingstrategies.Indeed, flexible project designs provide greaterreal-optionsvalue thanprojects
Table 2.

Estimated Real-Options Values for Slovenia,
Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina
RealOptions
Value

Slovenia

$ 70,090

Croatia
Bosnia-Herzegovina

$ 74,010
$ 96,707

Baseline Assumptions
Table 1.

Estimates of a from a Monte Carlo Simulation
for Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina

Slovenia
Croatia
Bosnia-Herzegovina

aT
.369
.419
.716

Presentvalueof futurecashflows
Costsavingsfromoptionto abandon
Increasedcostsfromoptionto expand
efforts
marketing
Expansionfactor(a)
Costsavingsfromoptionto scaleback
marketingefforts

factor(3)
Contraction
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UnderlyingLatticeand EquityLatticeUsingBaselineAssumptions:Bosnia-Herzegovina
$7,344,041
$3,588,772
$1,753,706

$1,753,706
$856,974

$856,974

$204,639

$204,639
$48,866

$48,866

$100,000

$100,000

$100,000

$100,000

$418,773

$418,773

$418,773
$204,639

$48,866
$23,879

$23,879

$23,879

$11,669

$11,669
Underlying Lattice

$5,702

$5,702
$2,786

$1,362

$14,638,082
$7,129,983
$3,457,412

$3,462,170
$1,670,912

$1,666,386
$361,717

$377,966

$103,073

$150,000

$174,049

$187,801

$196,707

$787,545

$792,304

$803,732
$390,249

$81,917

$95,361
$63,444

$50,000

$58,527
$50,000

$50,491
Equity Lattice

$50,000

$50,000
$50,000

$50,000
with fewer built-in options. This value is not consideredby
traditionalstatic NPV analysis. Intuitively, riskier projects
have largerreal-optionsvalues because managementhas the
flexibility to respond to this risk. Therefore,it is important
to remembera true definitionof risk-that is, the variability
of outcomes. Accordingly, risk can be valuable because
upside risks result in positive outcomes to the firm and its
customers,and managementmay indeed be able to weather
downside risks through proper risk management and the
flexibility to respond.
For Bosnia-Herzegovina, for example, if an exporter
determinedthat the NPV of an export venture to BosniaHerzegovina was $100,000, the true value of the project,
consideringthe combined options to abandon,expand, contract,or stay the course, would make the projectmore valuable than previously considered ($96,707 more underthese
baseline assumptions).Similarly,if the projectwere deemed
to have a negative NPV-for example, a negative NPV of
$50,000--the true value of the project would be a positive
$46,707 if the real-optionsvalue were considered, making
the project financially feasible. Regardless of the assumptions made, these results show thatthereis a clear economic

advantageto takingrisks, and the risks of an export transaction with a recovering economy should be valued accordingly to make a more accurateassessment of the costs and
benefits of such a venture.Exportersthat are risk takersand
are exceptionally skillful at adapting to changing market
conditions and, at times, to unruly risks are likely to find
these ex ante real-options values compelling. Similarly,
exportersthat are highly educatedon the business and marketing practices of the region are likely to maneuverbetter
through the myriad risks associated with exporting to a
countrysuch as Bosnia-Herzegovina (and, implicitly, other
recovering economies) and thus will likely find the ex ante
real-options value of the project as an extra incentive to
begin an exportventureinto the country.However, the existence of this ex ante real-optionsvalue is conditionedon the
premise that flexibility in responding to risk indeed exists
and is ensured.
Although the relationship between volatility and realoptions value is clear, importantmarketingandpolicy implications can also be drawnthrougha careful examinationof
the other assumptionsthat define the chooser option. Table
3 presents the baseline real-option value for Bosnia-
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Table3.

Changesin Real-OptionsValue(ChooserOption)for an ExportVentureto Bosnia-HerzegovinaResultingfrom
Changesin BaselineReal-OptionsAssumptions
Changesin Real-OptionsAssumptionsand the
Real-OptionsValuefrom the Baseline

Real-OptionsAssumptions
Costsavingsfromoptionto abandon
value
Real-options

$
0
$ 87,994

$ 25,000
$ 87,944

$ 50,000
$ 96,707

$ 75.000
$109,342

$100,000
$122,237

Increasedcosts from option to expand marketingefforts
Real-optionsvalue

$
0
$110,620

$ 25000
$103,664

$ 50,000
$ 96,707

$ 75,000
$ 89,869

$100,000
$ 83,140

1.00
$ 17,772

1.50
$ 50,456

2.00
$ 96,707

2.50
$143,304

3.00
$189,900

Cost savings from option to scale back marketingefforts
Real-optionsvalue

$
0
$ 96,707

$ 25000
$ 96,707

$ 50,000
$100,456

$ 75.000
$113,655

$100,000
$128,481

Contractionfactor (j)
Real-optionsvalue

.00
$ 96,707

.25
$ 96,707

.50
$ 96,707

.75
$ 96,707

1.00
$ 96,707

Expansionfactor (a)
Real-optionsvalue

.00
$17,772

Notes:Numbersthatarein boldandunderlined
thebaselinereal-options
Thenumberin bold($96,707)represents
thebaselinerealrepresent
assumptions.
thebaselineassumptions.
All otherunderlined
numbersrepresent
withsubsedeviationsfromthebaselineassumptions,
optionsvalue,incorporating
valuebelowtherespectivenumber.Forexample,changingthecost savingsfromtheoptionto abandon
to $25,000
quentchangesin thereal-options
from$50,000(baseline)lowersthe real-options
valueof the chooseroptionto $87,944,if all otherassumptions
areheldconstantat theirbaseline
values.

Herzegovina ($96,707) and then considers how the realoptions value would change given changes in real-options
assumptions, all else being equal. In the abandonment
option, there is a positive relationshipbetween the money
saved from abandoning the export venture and the realoptions value. For example, if the savings from abandonment were $100,000, the real-options value would be
$122,237. If there were no value to the firm to abandonthe
export venture after it engages in it, the real-optionsvalue
would still be substantialat $87,994 consideringthe chooser
option, even though the abandonmentoption on its own
would be worthless. This result suggests that the combined
options to expand and/or contract marketing efforts are
more valuable in the presence of risk than the option to
abandon the export venture. Under the presented scenario
assumptions,at least $28,000 in cost savings must be realized before the abandonmentoption contributesto the value
of the chooser option.
Indeed, the option to expand in the face of risk is most
valuable from a real-options perspective. Varying the
expansion factor from two times sales to three times sales
raises the real-optionsvalue to $189,900, almostdoublingit.
At the otherextreme,if no additionalsales arerealizedwhen
additionalmarketingefforts and marketingcosts are undertaken, the real-options value declines dramatically to
$17,772. If marketshare expands by 50% because of these
increased efforts, the real-optionsvalue increases considerably to $50,456. Similarly, in the context of the option to
expand marketingefforts, the lower the costs of this market
expansion,the higheris the real-optionsvalue, if we hold all
otherassumptionsconstantat the baseline levels. If sales are
assumed to double but no additional marketingcosts are
realized, the real-options value rises to $110,620 from the
baseline of $96,707, for which $50,000 in additionalmarketing costs are assumed; this represents an increase of
$13,913 in real-options value. Furthermore,if expansion

costs are assumed to be $100,000, the real-options value
declines to $83,140, a differenceof -$13,567 fromthe baseline. When the factors underlyingthe expansion portion of
the chooser option (the option to expand marketingefforts)
are considered,the assumptionrelatedto additionalmarket
share drives the bulk of the real-optionsvalue.
Perhaps the most notable result, however, comes from
consideringhow the real-optionsvalue changes as a result
of the changes in the assumptionsunderlyingthe option to
contract or scale back marketing efforts. Here, the realoptions value does not change as the contraction factor
varies from zero to one, confirming an obvious result that
losing market share does not contribute to real-options
value. Note, too, thatthe savings realizedfrom the choice to
scale back marketingefforts must be substantialto illicit a
change in the real-options value. Under the presented
assumptions,the cost savings from scaling back marketing
efforts need to be greater than $39,000 before the realoptions value of the projectincreasesrelativeto the baseline
value of $96,707. Indeed, as the cost savings from scaling
back marketing efforts increase, so does the real-options
value. The value obtained from the option to expand marketing efforts dwarfsthatof the optionto contractmarketing
efforts. Even at a fairly extreme contractionof sales, .25,
and $50,000 realizedin cost savings, the value of the expansion factor assumed must be less than 2 to achieve any
increase in the real-optionsvalue from a contractionof marketing efforts.

TheCoordination
Redux:
of
Imperative
and
Public
Finance,
Marketing,
Policy
Economies recovering from catastrophesare risky markets
in which to invest, but investmentin them is vital for recovery. Therefore,policy makers and marketersmust find and
use tools to understandinvestmentrisk and stimulateinvest-
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ment to the immediate and long-term benefit of numerous
stakeholders.Unfortunately,given the depth and breadthof
devastationfrom many catastrophes,extant fears, and simply "easier"or "safer"investment opportunities,even if a
helpful export venture is initially deemed to be feasible on
the basis of traditionalevaluation metrics, decision makers
likely would not supportsuch a venture. The real and perceived risks of conducting business in a recovering economy may overshadow any potential opportunity;management is likely to view the project as being too risky. These
factors and the subsequentchoice not to invest in markets
ravaged by catastrophe clearly retard societal recovery,
resulting in additional hardships and suffering. However,
considering the real-options value when evaluating the
financial feasibility of an export venture should provide an
additionalincentive for firms to adopt such a risky venture
beyond traditionalrisk assessment and moral imperatives.
Examiningand measuringthe risks and, ultimately,the realoptions value of, for example, exportmarketingto FYR provides substantialinsights for marketerswho are considering
similar venturesand also provides guidance to policy makers who are chargedwith assisting recoveringeconomies.
Key to understandingthe real-optionsvalue of any export
or FDI project to a recovering economy is the efficient
assessment and estimation of the variabilityof future cash
flows to the project. We appreciatethat some readersmay
find this statementto be rathercallous. However, the realities of donor fatigue, resource scarcity, and the probability
of futurecatastrophessuggest thatthe privatesector,including marketingfirms, must have financialincentivesto invest
in currentlyrecoveringeconomies.
The most meaningful risk assessments probably arise
from longitudinalfield researchin the recoveringcountryor
areaof interest(e.g., Shultz et al. 2005), but most managers
who arepressedfor time and forced to make decisions in the
absence of data will likely not opt for this labor-intensive
and time-consumingmethod. We submit that deterrentsto
extensive fieldwork or the lack of data to make volatility
estimates need not be obstacles to the estimation and considerationof the real-optionsvalue. The frameworkwe presented in this research provides a logical, efficient, and
robust method to forecast the variability (risks) associated
with investment projects in recovering economies. Indeed,
in the absence of data,it provides a tool (1) to make reasonable assessments of risk; (2) to enable potentialinvestors to
attachvalue to risk; and, ultimately, (3) to stimulateinvestment in recoveringeconomies, which is paramountfor optimal recovery and is to the benefit of marketers,policy makers, and citizen stakeholdersof the devastated country or
region.
Marketenvironmentswith high levels of risk indeed contain considerablereal-optionsvalue. This is especially true
if the investment is considered in terms of conditional
responses to uncertainty,provided that managementmaintains the flexibility to respondto the uncertainty.In the context of an export marketing venture to the countries of
Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina, these conditional responses are assumed to be the combined option to
abandonthe project,to expandmarketingefforts, or to scale
back marketing efforts. Bosnia-Herzegovina, the FYR
strugglingmost to emerge from the devastationof war, has

the highest measuredrisk and, therefore, the highest realoptions value in the presence of managerialflexibility. The
highest-risk projects inherently carry the highest realoptions value, which arguesfor marketingstrategiesthat are
flexible in the presence of this risk and ensure this flexibility, such that real-optionsvalue is preserved.For example,
specific marketing strategies, such as strategic alliances,
should contain enforceable language that enables management to respond to uncertainty.Ultimately, marketingand
public policies that favor FDI should rewardflexibility and
readiness to respond to both good and bad outcomes that
may arise during the course of conducting business in a
recovering economy. Moreover, investments and investment incentives invoked by policy makers should facilitate
marketentry and should target sectors that are vital to individual and societal welfare. A few sectors come to mind as
possible examples: food and agribusiness,health care, communicationstechnologies, and other industriesthat connect
citizens and institutionsto local and global marketingsystems thattangiblyenhancesocioeconomic recovery.A commonality among them, aside from a demonstrableimpact on
consumer and societal value, is that returnon investment is
likely or certainlypossible, even if the investment environment deteriorates.
Our results indicate that the option to expand the export
marketing venture after it has been initiated contributes
most to the value of a chooser option. As we describedin the
previous section and in Table 3, real-optionsvalue increases
commensuratewith the assumptionabout increased market
share from expansion and is inversely related to the cost of
the expansion. Therefore, "lean" marketing strategies that
promote rapid market expansion and penetrationat a reasonably low cost should be designed and implemented.
These are likely strategiesthatalso would benefit from firsthand knowledge of local marketconditions, solid relationships with customers and other decision makers in the
importingcountry,and policies that foster a certainlevel of
business risk taking (e.g., export guarantee programs
designed to foster trade and development) in recovering
economies.
Although an option to expand contributesgreatly to the
value of the chooser option, an option to abandonthe export
venture completely could also be valuable; this is particularly true when the cost saving or cost recovery realized
from abandonmentis higher. This result suggests that there
are strongbenefits from policies that focus on attractinginitial investmentcomparedwith policies that encouragelargescale capital investments in the recovering region. Again,
the aforementioned sectors come to mind as examples.
Capitalinvestmentsin factories,processing facilities, distribution centers, or other fixed assets may not be salvageable
if the ventureneeds to be abandoned.Conversely,marketing
ventures that rely more on leasing arrangements,strategic
alliances with local partners,and other strategies that are
variable-cost intensive versus fixed-cost intensive potentially provide greatervalue to the option to abandonin the
context of the chooser option. Although the option to abandon contributesto the overall value of the chooser option,
the impact of the option merely to scale back marketing
efforts is the least valuable;the option to scale back marketing efforts is valuableonly if the cost savings from doing so
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are substantial.Given these contingenciesand the inevitable
impact on the marketing system (especially suffering
humans),policies shouldbe developed to rewardcompanies
for staying the course and being aggressive with their marketing efforts to abet recovery, even in the face of risk.
Finally, we reemphasize that this framework can be
applied to several contexts-for example, in the recovering
economies in the Middle East, Central Asia, Sri Lanka,
BandaAceh, and even New Orleans.The factorsdrivingthe
variabilityof the discountedcash flows over the initial life
of the ventureare likely the same. Furthermore,considering
the real-optionsvalue of any venture in the wake of catastrophemay help convince policy makersto provide incentives for marketingcompanies to trade with and conduct
business in recovering economies. Increased commercial
activity will create more uniform and effective systems,
enhanceefficiencies, and more broadlylead to win-win outcomes for investing firms, as well as the suffering consumers and marketing firms in the countries and areas
recoveringfrom catastrophe.
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